Economic crises are often associated with increasing levels of income segregation and income polarization. Poor neighborhoods generally hit more severely, with unemployment levels increasing and income levels dropping more than in better-off neighborhoods. In this article, we study the correlation between economic recession and income segregation in Malmö, Sweden, with focus on development in the regions' poorest neighborhoods. We compare and contrast these areas' development during a period of economic crisis (1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995) with development during a period characterized by relative economic stability. Our findings suggest that (1) income segregation and income polarization indeed increased during the period of economic crisis; (2) neighborhoods that were already poor before the crisis fared worse than the region in general; and (3) this development was due to both in situ changes and to residential sorting, where the differences in income and employment status between people moving into a neighborhood, those moving out, and those who remained in place were greater during the period of recession compared to the more stable period.
Introduction
There is a long scholarly tradition of studying urban development trends, including urban areas' tendencies toward increasing levels of residential segregation and social polarization, in relation to economic change and/or city growth and decline (e.g., Cloutier, 1984; Wilson, 1987) . In his overview of ethnic and socio-economic segregation in Europe, Musterd (2005, p. 342) states that "social segregation levels tend to be higher in manufacturing cities and those currently struggling with economic restructuring." However, relatively few studies have attempted to empirically assess how a particular economic transformation -like rapidly expanding unemployment in times of economic crisis -affects residential segregation patterns. It is intuitively expected that economic change will have such effects. During a crisis, households will gain or lose economically and this will translate into spatially selective impacts.
The Swedish economic crisis in 1992-1993 exhibited such geographically uneven outcomes. As shown by Andersson (1998) , the Stockholm region lost some 100,000 jobs (about 12% of total employment) from 1990 to 1995; some housing estates, however, lost half of their jobs, and job losses in the range of 30% to 40% were not uncommon in some neighborhoods. The neighborhoods that did comparatively worse were often relatively poor even before the crisis, with an overrepresentation of residents with a low level of education, low earnings, and a vulnerable position in the labor market. Hence, we posit that a financial crisis may lead to increasing levels of segregation and/or increases in the relative concentration of poverty.
A situation in which already poor neighborhoods are becoming even poorer, relative to the city average, can be the result of in situ changes in employment rates and income levels (as discussed by Andersson, 1998) or of selective migration processes in which better-off residents leave increasingly poor neighborhoods and are replaced by inmovers with lower socio-economic status. Increasing impoverishment of already poor neighborhoods may also lead to increasing selectivity in mobility patterns, as the poor neighborhoods become even less attractive and stigmatized, which further reinforces the process of decline (Andersson & Bråmå, 2004) .
In this article, we ask two sets of questions. The first is related to the relationship between economic decline and residential segregation. Does an economic crisis, such as the Swedish recession during the early 1990s, lead to increasing levels of segregation? Are such patterns more visible in a region hit worse by an economic downturn compared to other regions? We focus on one such region -Malmö -that not only suffered badly from the recession but also, as an older manufacturing region, is struggling with economic restructuring -hence, it should have higher levels of segregation according to Musterd (2005) . Our second set of questions examines development in the worst-off neighborhoods in this region and aims to analyze population processes that may enhance the spiral of decline. How did already poor neighborhoods develop during the period of economic crisis? To what extent did their population composition change as a result of the macro-economic situation, including potential increases in residential segregation? To what extent can such changes be explained by in situ changes, and what is the role of selective mobility?
Western Europe has recently been hit by a severe recession that has had strong negative effects on the economies of several countries. Sweden has, however, remained relatively unaffected. For example, while unemployment rates in countries like Spain and Greece almost doubled between 2005 and 2010 (2011 in the case of Greece), from about 10% to about 20%, unemployment rates in Sweden remained relatively stable at around 8% (Eurostat). This period of relative stability serves, in this article, as a period of contrast to the financial crisis period of the early 1990s. How did the Malmö region develop in terms of levels of income segregation during this period of stability, compared to the period of crisis? Were there any remarkable differences in the development of the poor neighborhoods in terms of overall socio-economic status, population composition, and residential sorting patterns? To what extent can the patterns identified be attributed to the economic crisis, and to what extent are they part of a more general trend?
Previous research
In a comprehensive study of 216 US metro regions for the period 1970 to 2000, Watson (2009, p. 822) found a "strong and robust relationship between income inequality and income segregation, after controlling for metropolitan area fixed effects, year effects, and a number of other factors. Inequality at the bottom of the distribution is related to the residential isolation of the poor, while inequality at the top is associated with segregation of the rich." She recognized that this relationship, via mechanisms of "neighborhood effects," may also have a reversed causality (i.e., segregation feeds income inequality), but she assumed that "the reverse causality factors are slower-acting and smaller in magnitude than the direct effect of income inequality on residential choice" (pp. 842-843) .
Regarding the relationship between economic decline and residential segregation, an important question is whether economic decline leads to increasing inequality. We argue that this is often the case and that it is due to both primary and secondary effects of an economic downturn, at least in the context of an advanced welfare state like Sweden. In short, an economic downturn will have the primary effect of lowering the demand for labor, rendering more people unemployed. This will lower tax revenues and lead to employment cutbacks in the public sector, possibly even to welfare state retrenchment (i.e., less state compensation for unemployed and sick workers). This process describes fairly well the sequence of developments following the acute Swedish financial crisis in the early 1990s, but it should be noted that political decisions did affect developments and that -in theory -a more Keynesian approach to managing the crisis might have resulted in a different chain of events. As in the case of wider European debate today, however, many economists would argue that a Keynesian approach was not possible in the context of a high and rapidly increasing state budget deficit.
Furthermore, researchers have found that financial crises and economic restructuring tend to be harshest for those in the most vulnerable positions in the labor market, while individuals in better positions and/or with higher levels of education generally do better (Clark, 2007; Iceland, Sharpe, & Steinmetz, 2005) . Consequently, economic decline often leads to increased economic inequality.
Recent studies on Sweden indicate increasing levels of income inequality (Björklund & Jäntti, 2011; OECD, 2011) , and point to the reduced redistributive impact of the tax and welfare benefit systems as the underlying cause of these changes (see also Ferrarini, Nelson, Palme, & Sjöberg, 2012) . Following Watson (2009) , we anticipate that increasing income inequality in Sweden will lead to an increase in residential segregation by income. Scarpa (2013) considered this complex relationship in a recent study of Malmö, Sweden. Focusing on the 1991-2008 period, he found increasing income inequalities, which he argued were an outcome of the reduced redistributive impact of the Swedish welfare state. He also concluded that increases in residential segregation by income could be attributed to the parallel increase in citywide income inequality rather than to an alleged increase in neighborhood sorting. The latter conclusion is based on the fact that neighborhood income inequality was not associated with a stronger homogeneity of the social composition of neighborhoods in Malmö.
We argue that any attempt to theorize the relationship between economic decline and residential segregation must incorporate theoretical elements from different broad traditions of analysis, including structural as well as behavioral. While structural approaches tend to emphasize the workings of different institutions and markets, they often disregard individual agency. Behavioral approaches focus on households' preferences and decisions and do not explicitly take structural changes into account. However, if, for instance, a poor neighborhood becomes poorer due to rising levels of unemployment, it can be hypothesized that the new conditions will feed secondary changes, such as lowering the level of purchasing power in the neighborhood, which may lead to a reduction of commercial services (Massey & Denton, 1993) . Furthermore, deteriorating conditions will also be evaluated by prospective in-and out-movers and will thus influence mobility decisions. This is in line with Wilson (1987, pp. 49-50) , who argued that middle-class Black households left the inner city areas of the United States in the wake of worsened employment prospects and social conditions.
As we have noted above, financial crises and economic restructuring tend to be harshest for those in the most vulnerable positions in the labor market (Clark, 2007; Iceland et al., 2005) . Consequently, we hypothesize that economic decline will hit already poor neighborhoods, which tend to have an overrepresentation of such inhabitants, especially hard. Many before us have contributed to the field of residential segregation in relation to poverty and poor neighborhoods, focusing on, for instance, out-mobility from socio-economically deprived and/or immigrant-dense neighborhoods and on the effects of neighborhood compositional change (e.g., Meen, Gibb, Goody, McGrath, & Mackinnon, 2005; Van Ham & Clark, 2009; Wilson, 1987) . Such patterns and processes are gaining increasing attention in Sweden. For example, Andersson and Bråmå (2004) have shown how deprived neighborhoods are being reproduced through mobility patterns where people who leave these neighborhoods are more often employed than those entering the same areas. This mobility has been found to be more profound during economic downturns than it is during upturns (Andersson, Bråmå, & Hogdal, 2008) . Similar patterns have been found in other countries (see Bolt, Van Kempen, & Van Ham, 2008; Card, Mas, & Rothstein, 2008; Jargowsky, 1997) .
If the level of segregation increases, it is likely that residents who move will take greater account of neighborhood conditions and that those who have more housing options will tend to avoid particular types of neighborhoods. Such "middle-class flight and avoidance" (Friedrichs, 1998) is generally thought to be based on both "objective" grounds, that is, knowledge about deteriorating social conditions in certain neighborhoods, and on different types of representations (e.g., stigmatization; see Permentier, 2013; Wacquant, 2008) . It is furthermore likely that people less aware of a neighborhood's negative associations and/or those who have fewer housing options will become an increasing proportion of residents moving into poor neighborhoods.
As pointed out by Musterd (2005) , drawing upon earlier analyses by Galster (1988) in the United States and Peach (1999) in the United Kingdom, ethnic segregation in these countries has socio-economic components, but these sometimes explain only around 10% of the level of ethnic segregation. Swedish studies have indicated a much stronger relationship between ethnic segregation and socio-economic status, in particular a strong overlap between concentrations of poverty and of refugee immigrants (Andersson, Bråmå, & Holmqvist, 2010) . Immigrants, especially recent immigrants from refugee countries, tend to have a very weak labor market position and consequently to be highly overrepresented in the poorest neighborhoods. The labor market position and low income among immigrants on average when compared to natives is also commonly cited as one main explanation of ethnic residential segregation in the Swedish context. All in all, the above discussion suggests that in times of crisis (1) income segregation will increase due to increasing income inequality; (2) immigrants will be more affected than natives, given the former's more vulnerable position in the labor market, which will lead to increased levels of ethnic segregation; (3) this development will on the local (neighborhood) level manifest itself either in more neighborhoods becoming incomepoor and immigrant-dense or in these densities increasing in existing poor neighborhoods; and (4) as a behavioral reaction, reinforced selective migration will occur where people (predominantly natives) with higher incomes leave poor neighborhoods and/or avoid moving into such areas. 
Data and methods
For this study we make use of rich register data delivered by Statistics Sweden. The GeoSweden database, owned by the Institute for Housing and Urban Research at Uppsala University, comprises all Swedish permanent residents from 1990 to 2010 with annual data on demographic, socio-economic, housing, and work place characteristics. All data are geocoded and all individuals can be followed over time. For the analyses in this article, we use data for 4 years (1990, 1995, 2005, and 2010 ) split into two five-year periods (1990-1995 and 2005-2010) . The first period covers the economic recession of the early 1990s. The second period is used for comparison and represents a period during which much of Europe faced a severe economic crisis while the Swedish economy remained relatively stable. Changes that took place in the earlier period but not in the later one can hence be assumed to be at least partly due to the 1990s recession.
2 Since our focus is on labor market-related outcomes, we have restricted the population to individuals of working age, 20-64 years.
Our study employs two different spatial units, the labor market region and the neighborhood. Sweden is divided into 100 labor market regions, which are administrative areas based on commuting patterns. They vary substantially in size and population. Malmö labor market region encompasses 15 municipalities and was in 2010 home to about 700,000 people. On the labor market region, we present descriptive data for income segregation levels in 1990 and 2010, complemented with more detailed information about population composition, employment levels, income polarization (understood as population shares belonging to the lowest, middle, and highest income groups, defined below) and levels of segregation for Stockholm and Malmö in 1990 , 1995 , 2005 . Estimates of segregation and polarization are based on differences between neighborhoods within the region. Neighborhoods are defined as SAMS (small area market statistics) units, having on average around 1000 residents. The SAMS area division is made by Statistics Sweden in collaboration with each municipality. SAMS is a frequently used proxy for neighborhoods in Swedish segregation and neighborhood effect studies (e.g., Bråmå, 2006) .
Our main focus, however, is not on neighborhoods or segregation patterns in general but on (population) processes leading to increasing levels of poverty concentration in the region as a whole and in the worst-off neighborhoods in particular. Most of our analyses focus on such processes in Malmö's poorest neighborhoods. We have selected neighborhoods that were targeted by the political interventions launched in the mid1990s to avoid and even thwart further segregation through a range of efforts aimed at improving liveability, employment, school children's academic performances, and cultural life (Andersson, 2006) .
Key variables in this study are income, employment status, and immigrant status. Income is defined as income from work, including income from work-related benefits such as parental leave, sick leave, and so forth. In a welfare state of the pre-crisis Swedish type the link between work income and poverty, defined according to disposable income, was relatively weak.
3 Despite this, we argue that income from work is a better estimate of a person's socio-economic status since it not only measures income but also, indirectly, employment status, type of job, and level of education; furthermore, it is unaffected by state transferences such as child benefits, housing allowances, and social benefits. The correlation between economic decline/development and income should consequently be more evident by using income from work. Based on the national income distribution, we categorize individuals into three groups (low, middle, and high income) according to income decile: low = decile 1-3, middle = decile 4-7, high = decile 8-10. A similar categorization has been used in several other studies analyzing income segregation and its consequences (see Galster, Andersson, & Musterd, 2014) .
Employment is measured yearly in the first week in November. In order to exclude persons with only temporary contracts, we define someone as employed if he or she is registered as employed and has an annual earning above the amount computed by Statistics Sweden for social insurance purposes ("basbelopp") -SEK 29,700 in 1990 and SEK 42,400 in 2010.
For each person in the data, we also have information on country of birth. For simplicity, we categorize country of birth into four large groups: Swedish (including Swedish-born children of immigrants), Western (individuals born in countries of the EU15 and EES, and in North America, Japan, and Oceania), Eastern European (born in the rest of Europe and in Russia and former Soviet states), and non-Western (born in the rest of Asia including Turkey, and in Africa and Latin America). A majority of refugee countries are found in the latter category; the main exception is the large inflow of people from former Yugoslavia during the mid-1990s.
Most of our analyses are descriptive in character and are presented in tables and figures below. Descriptive information provides an overview of the trends during the two periods. However, to get a better understanding of the residential sorting in Malmö's poor neighborhoods, we complement the descriptive analyses with two logistic multivariate regression analyses. The objective of these regressions is to identify key characteristics of groups we define as "in-movers," "stayers," and "out-movers" in respect to poor Malmö neighborhoods. The regression analyses include the abovedescribed variables together with control variables related to individuals' sex, age, family status, and level of education. In the first model, analyzing differences between inmovers to the poor areas and in-movers to other areas, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the individual moved within or into the Malmö region. In the second analysis, analyzing differences between stayers and out-movers from the poor areas, all individuals lived in the region by default. Unlike the first regression, however, this second regression includes variables that indicate changes in family status and income during the five-year period. Income change is categorized into quartiles (quartile 1 is the 25% of our population having the weakest income development 1990-1995/ 2005-2010 and quartile 4 the 25% seeing the most improvements). Change in family composition is estimated as going from single to couple and vice versa, and from not having children living in the household to having children and vice versa. Such changes in family composition and income are generally important in explaining mobility decisions. These variables could not, however, be included in the first regression due to a lack of data for some individuals -not all in-movers to Malmö's neighborhoods lived in Sweden in the first year of the period (1990 or 2005) , and since we argue that the inflow of new immigrants is key to understanding the reproduction of the characteristics of these worst-off neighborhoods, it would be unwise to exclude them. For the same reason -the many newcomers for whom we do not have information for the first year of the period -we estimate many control variables at t + 5, that is, at the end of the period. The reader should thus be aware that the findings do not necessarily represent the status of the individuals at the time they moved in/out.
Employment and segregation change in Sweden 1990 to 2010
Due to combinations of political economic reforms (financial deregulations), a bank crisis, currency policies, and international market changes, Sweden faced a severe economic downturn in 1992 to 1993/1994. GDP fell by 5.1% between 1991 and 1993, and private investments by 35% (Englund, 1999) . The recession eventually affected all economic sectors and led to severe employment cutbacks, first in the export sectors and later in sectors relying on domestic demand and tax revenues (Giavazzi & Pagano, 1996) ; registered unemployment increased from about 1.5% to 8.2% (Ekonomifakta, 2013 ; see also Calmfors, 1994, p. 7) . Unemployment rates have been fairly stable at that level since, and it seems highly unlikely that the pre-crisis employment levels will be reestablished in the foreseeable future.
Regional variations were quite marked. Employment levels were relatively low in parts of the north and the southeast of the country and very high in a number of towns dominated by manufacturing industry and in the large metropolitan regions of Stockholm, Malmö, and Gothenburg. Among the larger cities, Malmö had without doubt the weakest economic development (it ranked third from the bottom among the 100 labor market regions 1990 to 2010). Since 1990, Malmö has had a very limited increase in job opportunities (from 278,000 to 295,000), while the population increase among working-age people has been substantial. This has resulted in a sharp overall reduction in employment frequencies, from 83% employed in 1990 to below 73% 20 years later.
Segregation by income is also generally higher in the larger metropolitan regions. Although income segregation is generally low in Sweden due to a combination of housing and urban policies, wage policies, and redistribution of welfare through the tax and benefit systems, a vast majority of the labor market regions experienced an increase in income segregation between 1990 and 2010. The average index of segregation measured as the residential differences between the three lowest work income deciles and the remaining seven deciles stood at .11 in 1990 and increased to .14 twenty years later (see Figure 1 ). Regions hit hard by the economic crisis, resulting in an increase in the share of low-income people, also experienced an increase in the level of income segregation. A similar pattern was not found after the crisis (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . Table 1 provides more detailed information on trends in population composition, employment, income polarization, and segregation for Malmö and Stockholm (the latter for comparative purposes). It reveals that the severe drop in employment rates took place during the economic crisis (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , whereas employment levels have been relatively stable ever since. Income polarization, as measured by the Gini index, increased during the crisis in both Stockholm and Malmö, but has remained relatively stable since the crisis (see also Andersson et al., 2010) . Income segregation has developed similarly in the Malmö case, starting at a low initial level, increasing during the crisis years, and then remaining relatively stable at the new higher level. Both Stockholm and Malmö have witnessed a profound change in ethnic population composition between 1990 and 2010. In Malmö, the share of foreign-born people in the working-age population increased from 14% to almost 26% and the share of people born in non-Western countries grew from 3% to 11%. This trend mirrors a general trend in Sweden, with a very fast rate of refugee immigration. Such a rapid change in ethnic composition of the population might be relatively unproblematic in periods of prosperous economic development, but in times when unemployment levels are high it is generally very difficult for the new immigrants to find jobs. As shown in Table 1 , employment frequencies are substantially lower among immigrants in general and non-Western immigrants in particular in both Stockholm and Malmö. The non-Western immigrants also suffered more from the financial crisis, with larger drops in employment rates. They have, however, also recovered better than the population in general. Zooming in: income segregation, inequality, and residential sorting in Malmö and its poorest neighborhoods
Malmö is Sweden's third largest labor market region, home to approximately 716,000 inhabitants in 2010. The region has long been dominated by the manufacturing industry. The decline in such jobs over the past 30-plus years has thus had a great impact on the region's economic development; as we have shown, unemployment levels are generally higher in Malmö compared to other large Swedish cities and the region was also more negatively affected by the economic recession in the early 1990s. Like many other European formerly industrial cities, the Malmö region has also witnessed a shift in its population distribution. Over time, Malmö city has experienced a relative population decline, while suburban municipalities in the region have attracted many households that have managed relatively well during the deindustrialization phase. This shift can partly be explained by the tenure structure of the region, where the core is dominated by multifamily housing and home ownership dominates the suburbs. The consequence of this shift is that Malmö city has been more negatively affected by the sluggish economic development than have its surrounding suburbs. The concentration of low-income people in the regional core is one explanation for the Malmö region's increasing levels of income segregation. Another is the change within the core towards increasing concentrations of low-income people in certain neighborhoods. Between 1990 and 2010 the region saw a sharp increase in the number of people living in a low-income neighborhood, defined as a neighborhood where the share of low-income people is two standard deviations higher than the neighborhood average of the region. This increase was due to both a general increase in the number of URBAN GEOGRAPHYneighborhoods defined as poor and an increase in the number of inhabitants in the already poor neighborhoods. Between 1990 and 1995, the number of poor neighborhoods, as defined above (and only including neighborhoods with a minimum of 30 inhabitants), increased from 16 to 24, or from 2.4% to 3.6% of the total number of neighborhoods in the region. At the same time, the number of inhabitants living in poor neighborhoods increased from 2.7% of the region's population in 1990 to 6.7% in 1995. Most of these were low-income people. A trend towards increasing levels of segregation and/or increasing spatial concentration of a subgroup can be explained by two different sets of population dynamics. The first is a change in existing neighborhood populations (for a discussion of the importance of such processes related to ethnic segregation, see Finney & Simpson, 2009 ). Inhabitants living in already poor neighborhoods, or in neighborhoods close to poverty, may for instance be more severely affected by an economic recession than inhabitants in other neighborhoods. The second type of explanation relates to selective migration, where employment levels and/or income levels among in-movers to poor neighborhoods are well below those of out-movers.
In the subsequent sections, we will analyze population dynamics in the poorest neighborhoods in more detail during the two periods. For this section we have selected neighborhoods that were targeted by the political interventions launched in the mid1990s. We do not aim to evaluate the efforts as such but can conclude that the outcome has been very different from the hopes stated in official documents. Rather than improving the economic situation of inhabitants, development in these areas until 2010 has been characterized by a substantial increase in the proportion of people with very low incomes, while the presence of better-paid workers has declined (see Table 2 ). Employment levels have also decreased dramatically, from 71.6% in 1990 to 44.5% in 2010. However, in line with the general economic trajectory, this downward trend occurred mainly during the economic crisis in the early 1990s. Between 1990 and 1995, employment levels in these neighborhoods fell by an astonishing 30 percentage points, to almost half the original level, and the share of low-income people increased from 43% to 60.3%. Since 1995, these proportions have been relatively stable. The Table 2 . Population, employment, and income polarization in Malmö's targeted neighborhoods, 1990, 1995, 2005, and 2010 number of people living in the targeted areas has, however, increased substantially over time.
Another clear trend is the change in ethnic composition. In 1990 immigrants from non-Western countries made up 12.2% of the working age population in the targeted neighborhoods. Between 1990 and 1995, this share went up by an astonishing 55%, accompanied by an increasing geographical concentration of the immigrant population in the core city and especially in the poor neighborhoods (see also Andersson et al., 2008; Billing, 2000) . The share of non-Western immigrants living in the targeted areas has continued to increase over time, and in 2010 35% of the working-age population in these neighborhoods was born in a country classified as non-Western. In the same year 62% of the population was born abroad. One explanation is the construction of the Öresund Bridge between Sweden and Denmark, which has resulted in an increasing Danish-born population, but more important in this context is that Malmö is a popular destination for newly arrived refugees.
The poor development during especially the early time period can, as mentioned, be explained either by the fact that the existing population in the targeted areas was hit harder by the crisis than inhabitants in other neighborhoods, or by selective migration into and out of these areas. In Figure 2 we show employment status in 1990 and 1995 and in 2005 and 2010 for individuals who lived in the same neighborhood in both years, for targeted areas and the entire Malmö labor market region (targeted areas included). The figures show clearly that employment rates are considerably lower in the targeted areas compared to the region and that this gap is larger in the later period. However, while there is not much difference between the targeted areas and the region in terms of changes in employment during the more recent period, Figure 2 shows that inhabitants in the targeted areas were indeed more severely affected by the economic recession in the early 1990s. More people living in these areas went from employment to nonemployment compared to those living in other parts of the region (21.2% vs. 13.7%). This development enhanced the initial gap in employment rates by 14 percentage points. However, although over two-fifths of the employed "stayers" in targeted neighborhoods lost their jobs between 1990 and 1995, the overall employment rate in these neighborhoods fell even more (as shown in Table 3 ). Hence, it is plausible that selective migration patterns further reinforced the downward trend in these areas. 
2005-2010
Targeted area Malmö region Figure 2 . Employment rates in 1990-1995 and 2005-2010 for stayers in targeted neighborhoods and all of Malmö labor market region for population aged 20-60 in 1990 (25-65 in 1995) . Values in %. Figure 3 shows employment levels among stayers, in-movers, and out-movers with respect to the targeted areas during our two time periods. The general pattern is that those moving into the targeted areas had a substantially lower employment rate than those leaving and -especially among younger people -also lower than those staying, which is in line with previous Swedish findings ( Andersson & Bråmå, 2004) . This applies to immigrants as well as natives. The gap between out-movers and in-movers was, however, larger during the earlier period, mostly due to a lower employment rate among in-movers in 1990-1995 compared to 2005-2010 . A potential interpretation is that people who became unemployed during the crisis, or whose employment prospects decreased during this period, became more likely to move to these neighborhoods. Such patterns, combined with outflows of employed individuals, would lead to increased concentrations of poverty over time. Before drawing such conclusions, however, it is important to look at where the in-movers came from -whether from within the region, or from other parts of Sweden, or abroad. Another difference between the two periods concerns employment rates by age. It seems as if the more recent period posed a much more difficult employment situation for older people. While employment rates in 1995 peaked at around age 50, they now peak much earlier (35 to 40 for stayers and around 25 for the entire group of out-movers).
In an attempt to cast more light on the sorting going on in Stockholm's immigrantdense neighborhoods, Andersson (2013) studied all intra-urban migrants and neighborhood stayers [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . He found ethnic differences in the probability of entering immigrant-dense neighborhoods but not for the probability of leaving, which he argued supports the "native avoidance" but not the "native flight" hypothesis (see also Bråmå, 2006) . We follow up on this analysis by conducting similar analyses for the targeted Malmö neighborhoods, but with more focus on sorting based on income and employment. We run two different models. The first analyses differences between in-movers to the targeted neighborhoods and in-movers to other neighborhoods in the Malmö region and the second analyses differences between stayers and out-movers with respect to the targeted areas themselves. Both models are run twice, once for each time period. Descriptive statistics of all variables are found in Table 3 . Results of the two models, for the two periods, are shown in Figures 4 (model 1, comparing in-movers to the targeted area to "other in-movers") and 5 (model 2, comparing stayers to out-movers). Full results from the statistical models, including standard errors and level of significance, are in the Appendix.
Odds ratios from the model comparing movers into targeted neighborhoods to movers moving elsewhere in the Malmö region are presented in Figure 4 . Results show that movers into the targeted areas were less likely to be employed and considerably more likely to have a low income compared to other movers. They were also considerably more likely to be born outside of Sweden. In addition, results show that these differences are generally more pronounced in the later period, with the exception of differences in employment. The poor economic development during the earlier period thus resulted in increased sorting based on employment, while other aspects of sorting -especially income and ethnicity -became more important later. In addition, the combination of low income and ethnic minority status results in substantially Appendix Table A1 ).
higher odds of entering the targeted areas. In 1990-1995 this effect is strongest for immigrants from Eastern Europe, probably explained by the large refugee immigration from the former Yugoslavia, while it is stronger for people from non-Western countries during the later period. Figure 5 presents odds ratios from the regression comparing stayers in the targeted neighborhood to out-movers from the same areas. Since this model only includes people who lived in the targeted areas (and hence in Sweden) in the first year (1990 or 2005), we also include some estimates of change in family status and income over time. In the early period, we see that stayers in the targeted neighborhoods were more likely than out-movers to be employed at the end of the period but also more likely to have a low level of education and a low level of income and to have experienced a drop in income (income change quartile 1 or 2) between 1990 and 1995. The odds ratios for being born abroad are all negative, but the interaction terms reveal that this is only relevant for those with high incomes -all ethnic minority groups are more likely than Swedish born to remain in the targeted areas if their incomes are at a low or medium level, and this is especially true for people of non-Western origin. The socio-economic patterns also hold true during the second period, 2005-2010, but they are generally less strong. Hence, it appears that the economic recession also had a strong impact on sorting patterns from the targeted areas, leaving those with low and/or dropping incomes behind. The results for ethnic minority groups of low or medium incomes 1990-1995 2005-2010 Figure 5. Odds ratios from regression comparing stayers in targeted neighborhoods (1) to outmovers from targeted neighborhoods (0). Most values are statistically significant, with the exception of those very close to 1 (see Appendix Table A2 ).
are, however, very similar compared to the early time period (ethnicity term and interaction term combined; the exception is non-Western minorities with low income, for whom the odds of staying put were much stronger during the first period). Ethnic minorities below the high income level thus tend to be "trapped" in the targeted areas to a much higher extent than low-income natives and/or high-income minorities. Overall, we find that sorting on economic grounds is stronger during the economic recession compared to the more recent period, when people of low incomes were more likely to both move into and remain in our case study areas. The extra penalty for lowincome ethnic minorities exists during both time periods but we clearly see how the inflow of new migrants affects sorting patterns -during the early period, low income Eastern Europeans were more likely to move into the targeted areas, while non-Western immigrants were more likely to do so during the second period. This is likely due to a shift in immigration patterns, where refugee immigration went from being dominated by former Yugoslavia during the early period to countries like Iraq, Syria, and Somalia during the later period. Ethnic differences are generally more pronounced for inmigration patterns into the targeted areas than for out-migration patterns from the same areas, especially during the second period, which is in line with previous findings (Andersson, 2013; Bråmå, 2006) .
Discussion and conclusions
In this article, we study the link between economic recession and levels of income segregation. Hypothesizing that those in the most vulnerable position on the labor market are hit hardest by an economic crisis, and therefore, that the consequences of a crisis are also more serious in neighborhoods that were already poor before the recession, we zoom in on a number of such neighborhoods in the Malmö region and analyze population processes that may enhance such a trajectory of decline. We do this by looking at two different time periods -one that was characterized by a severe economic crisis and one during which the economy was relatively stable. Although we cannot, based on our data, establish that economic recession causes increased levels of segregation and concentrations of poverty, our results suggest that there is a clear correlation between these two. In short, the period of economic recession in the early 1990s was characterized by sharp increases in both income inequality and income segregation and this development was especially pronounced in regions that suffered badly from the recession. The already poor neighborhoods experienced more dramatic increases in unemployment rates and relative share of low-income people compared to neighborhoods that were better off when the crisis began. During the more economically stable period, segregation levels are also more stable. These conclusions are in line with previous research, for example, results by Musterd (2005) stating that regions struggling with economic restructuring tend to have higher levels of residential segregation, and by scholars finding correlations between increasing levels of income inequality and increasing levels of income segregation (Scarpa, 2013; Watson, 2009) . It should, however, be added that this is certainly not a necessary outcome. The effects depend on a range of contextual issues, most importantly how the level of income redistribution (i.e., welfare) nationally and locally are affected by reduced levels of work income and higher rates of unemployment, as well as key features of the local housing markets (e.g., how housing prices change and how neighborhoods are composed in terms of tenure, dwelling sizes, and housing types). Sweden in 1990 had a compressed social system and a perhaps even more compressed system of neighborhoods (Musterd & Andersson, 2005) . Many neighborhoods were socially mixed and the level of income segregation was modest. Despite subsequent negative developments in terms of income segregation, levels of segregation were still modest in 2010 compared to many other countries.
Zooming in on the development in the poorest neighborhoods in the Malmö region, we found increasing numbers and proportions of low-income residents and found that the number of poor neighborhoods increased. We furthermore concluded that the share of unemployed and low-income people increased in the "old" poor neighborhoods. This negative trend in the poorest segment of the housing market is due to a combination of inhabitants in these areas being affected especially severely by the crisis -they were, for example, more likely than others to lose their jobs -and residential sorting. The status of the poor neighborhoods is constantly reproduced through negative socio-economic selection in which migrants to these neighborhoods are much poorer than other migrants to and within Malmö and those leaving these areas have a stronger position in the labor market than those entering and staying. The economic aspects of sorting were much more pronounced during the period of crisis compared to the period of economic stability, suggesting a correlation between macro-level economic development and rising levels of poverty in the poorest areas.
This sorting also has a distinct ethnic component. In Sweden, and in the poorest segments of the housing market especially, it is difficult to disentangle effects of economic segregation and ethnic segregation, since the poor areas tend to have a clear overrepresentation of ethnic minorities who often have a very weak position in the labor market. However, our findings suggest that the ethnic sorting was fairly similar during both periods. Low-income immigrant groups were generally more likely than both low-income natives and high-income immigrants to both enter the poorest neighborhoods and to remain there. These findings are in line with those of Andersson (2013) and Bråmå (2006) and suggest that these poor, immigrant-dense neighborhoods are being reproduced over time through the in-migration of newly arrived immigrants and a "flight" of comparatively better-off individuals.
In sum, our results suggest that the economic crisis was indeed associated with rising levels of income segregation and income inequality and that regions and neighborhoods that were already doing relatively badly before the crisis tend to be hit harder than other areas. The crisis took place at a time when the Swedish welfare state was stronger than it is today, with more effective welfare transfers and redistributions and thus a weaker link between work income and poverty. Initial levels of income inequality were also considerably lower. The structural changes that have taken place since the 1990s suggest that an economic crisis today would have an even stronger effect on income inequality and income segregation, resulting in higher levels of segregation and a further enhancing decline in the already worst-off neighborhoods.
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Notes
1. The applicability of the White Flight hypothesis to the Swedish case has, however been questioned by Andersson (2013) and Bråmå (2006) . 2. It is, of course, possible that other structural changes have had an effect on out outcomes; therefore, we can only make inferences about this economic development and cannot draw any firm conclusions about causality. 3. However, from 1990 onward, many political decisions have made the link between work and disposable income more direct. For example, unemployment now translates more rapidly into reduced disposable income as unemployment benefits are now less generous and last a shorter period of time. For Malmö, this becomes evident when we compare the relationship between the proportion of lowest work and disposable income quintiles in poor neighborhoods in 1990 and 2010: in 1990, 35% of people aged 20 to 64 were in the lowest work income quintile while only 18% were in the lowest disposable income quintile; for 2010, the corresponding proportions were 53% and 50%, respectively. Table A1 . Results from logistic regression of the likelihood of moving into targeted neighborhoods (1) versus moving into other neighborhoods in Malmö (0) (1990-1995 and 2005-2010 Table A2 . Results from logistic regression of the likelihood of staying in targeted neighborhoods (1) (1990-1995 and 2005-2010) versus moving out from these neighborhoods (0) (1990-1995 and 2005-2010 
